I just got home, and only saw the last few seconds. But if you are trying to win a game in the last seconds, this is no way to do it.
I have these questions:
1. If you want to try for a three, and if Alajiki is the team's best 3-point shooter at 60%, why isn't he on the floor for the last 4.3 seconds?
2. The team on the floor was Celestine, Anticevich, Kuany, Foreman, and Shepherd. Shepherd, at 30% for his career, had the least chance of making a three, so why is he the one taking the shot?
3. Shepherd drove down the floor, seeming not to look for anyone else. Anticevich was wide open, trailing Shepherd by a step. Even though Shepherd was double-teamed, he still took the shot.
4. Why do nearly all coaches (maybe all of them) in this situation seem to always opt to use their best player to drive the length of the floor as fast as he can and put up a last second prayer of a shot? I even saw Montgomery do it, when he had Justin Cobbs. Every opposing coach probably knows what the opponent is going to do, so he usually picks the opponent's best player up in the back court, and when that player gets into the frontcourt, he is immediately double-teamed to reduce the odds of success for the shooter even further. Why do coaches continue to use this simplistic mostly failing strategy for making the last second shot to win or tie a game?
I have told this story a few times, but in the 1958 Elite 8 game at the Cow Palace, Cal vs Seattle and Elgin Baylor, with 5 seconds left on the clock, the score was tied. Pete Newell, Cal's coach, called time out and drew up a play where the Bears set up along the length of the floor, so they could make 3 to 4 passes up the floor, and Al Buch would take a running shot, hopefully a layup at the other end. It worked nearly to perfection, 3 or 4 passes, ending up with Buch missing a running 5-foot floater at the rim. No player took a dribble, the ball never touched the floor. Seattle went on to win the game in overtime. They then won their semi-final game, but Baylor got hurt, and even though he played in the Final the next day, Seattle lost, and Kentucky won the NCAA title. It was particularly galling to Newell, because he felt Cal matched up against Kentucky really well, and he felt Cal would have beaten them and won their first NCAA title in 1958. In Fox's case, Cal had only 4.3 seconds, not 5 like Newell had, and I can understand him opting to take a three, and I can understand that he might not ever know of Pete Newell's apparently unique strategy for a last second shot, but he'd have to explain why he did not have Alajiki on the floor, and why he did not have Shepherd pass the ball to a better three point shooter. There were 4 of them on the floor to choose from.
I have these questions:
1. If you want to try for a three, and if Alajiki is the team's best 3-point shooter at 60%, why isn't he on the floor for the last 4.3 seconds?
2. The team on the floor was Celestine, Anticevich, Kuany, Foreman, and Shepherd. Shepherd, at 30% for his career, had the least chance of making a three, so why is he the one taking the shot?
3. Shepherd drove down the floor, seeming not to look for anyone else. Anticevich was wide open, trailing Shepherd by a step. Even though Shepherd was double-teamed, he still took the shot.
4. Why do nearly all coaches (maybe all of them) in this situation seem to always opt to use their best player to drive the length of the floor as fast as he can and put up a last second prayer of a shot? I even saw Montgomery do it, when he had Justin Cobbs. Every opposing coach probably knows what the opponent is going to do, so he usually picks the opponent's best player up in the back court, and when that player gets into the frontcourt, he is immediately double-teamed to reduce the odds of success for the shooter even further. Why do coaches continue to use this simplistic mostly failing strategy for making the last second shot to win or tie a game?
I have told this story a few times, but in the 1958 Elite 8 game at the Cow Palace, Cal vs Seattle and Elgin Baylor, with 5 seconds left on the clock, the score was tied. Pete Newell, Cal's coach, called time out and drew up a play where the Bears set up along the length of the floor, so they could make 3 to 4 passes up the floor, and Al Buch would take a running shot, hopefully a layup at the other end. It worked nearly to perfection, 3 or 4 passes, ending up with Buch missing a running 5-foot floater at the rim. No player took a dribble, the ball never touched the floor. Seattle went on to win the game in overtime. They then won their semi-final game, but Baylor got hurt, and even though he played in the Final the next day, Seattle lost, and Kentucky won the NCAA title. It was particularly galling to Newell, because he felt Cal matched up against Kentucky really well, and he felt Cal would have beaten them and won their first NCAA title in 1958. In Fox's case, Cal had only 4.3 seconds, not 5 like Newell had, and I can understand him opting to take a three, and I can understand that he might not ever know of Pete Newell's apparently unique strategy for a last second shot, but he'd have to explain why he did not have Alajiki on the floor, and why he did not have Shepherd pass the ball to a better three point shooter. There were 4 of them on the floor to choose from.
SFCityBear
