socaltownie said:

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Anyone that knows this page knows my opinion of him but at least he seems like he finally got it - that the Russians never always going practice diplomacy the way that Russia has for centuries - mollify and delay and let conditions on the ground actually determine outcomes. My senior thesis in undergrad looked at Soviet negotiating tactics in arms control - the actions over the past 12 months with Trump are straight from that playbook.

What I am hoping is that with new found commitment that it lasts more thana nanosecond and turns into real action on the battlefield.

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Sincere question - is there any scenario (short of Putin's removal/death), where Ukraine wins the war on the battlefield? What is the end game here?

Or are you simply suggesting that Putin won't negotiate unless he thinks the US/Europe will support Ukraine fighting a longer term (indefinite) war and Trump is signaling that?

I ask these questions as someone who 100% wishes that Ukraine could/would win this war and/or negotiate the best possible outcome. Unfortunately, I think Putin will not concede in part because he will never be convinced that the US/Nato will outlast him and/or impose real consequences.

BearGoggles said:

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socaltownie said:

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Anyone that knows this page knows my opinion of him but at least he seems like he finally got it - that the Russians never always going practice diplomacy the way that Russia has for centuries - mollify and delay and let conditions on the ground actually determine outcomes. My senior thesis in undergrad looked at Soviet negotiating tactics in arms control - the actions over the past 12 months with Trump are straight from that playbook.

What I am hoping is that with new found commitment that it lasts more thana nanosecond and turns into real action on the battlefield.

---

Sincere question - is there any scenario (short of Putin's removal/death), where Ukraine wins the war on the battlefield? What is the end game here?

Or are you simply suggesting that Putin won't negotiate unless he thinks the US/Europe will support Ukraine fighting a longer term (indefinite) war and Trump is signaling that?

I ask these questions as someone who 100% wishes that Ukraine could/would win this war and/or negotiate the best possible outcome. Unfortunately, I think Putin will not concede in part because he will never be convinced that the US/Nato will outlast him and/or impose real consequences.

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Trying to unpack Russian domestic politics and how it impacts foreign policy is challenging at best. So we are into the deepest of deep ends of crystal ball gazing. Russian opaqueness (true in the cold war, still true today) of actual macro economic and political conditions make this even more challenging. Anyone who says they know is an idiot. And that would be true even if wide open - it is a continent spanning country with several hundreds of millions of people. It is trying to say something about America in a paragraph ;-)

But with that caveat....

1) At some point the war because exhausting. Russian demographics suck and there seems to be some publicly available intel suggesting Russia is having manpower challenges. It is hard to fully assess that from the public sphere because Ukraine has every incentive of the world to highlight this data. But from what I followed it does seem clear to be a problem.

2) Russia has given up on a war on its border where the costs of fighting an attrition war is too steep - Afghanistan. At some point the Kremlin decided that the cost to the USSR for fighting that war was too high. And they didn't have public opinion to worry about. So it isn't like they are completely immune and arguably Putin wields significant less internal power than the Soviets did (as he has to placate oligarchs and others in the petro-crimnal state he has constructed).

3) But a full restoration of Ukraine's borders feels unlikely. I am not even sure it is in the west best interests (see below).

4) So I think with continued Ukrainian willingness to fight and western support we will see, at some point, a negotiated cease fire that provides a land bridge (Think roughly the M14 highway and then some sort of buffer zone North from that). Putin could claim that the Russian lives lost have secured the historic connection to the Crimea. Kiev gets to claim credit for throwing back and liming losses to essentially what they had defacto lost before 2022. We settle into a Korean like standoff likely and including a DMV buffer.

5) I think that deals with a source of tension in the geopolitical situation - that Russia believes it MUST have a land bridge to Crimea which has huge symbolic significance for the Russians. I am not sure there is an American parallel. Absent that concession Russia is liklely to feel continually threatened in its ability to defend Crimea that will continue to remain a source of tension and a possible spark for a resumption of hostilities.

What I don't have a good view on is the conditions in occupied Kherson. If Russification is proceeding in this pretty rural area then I think Russia is unlikely to give up much of the Eastern Bank of the Dneiper. If it isn't going well than I could see that being a "big concession" that Putin gives up for recognition of the territorial gains made before 2022.

socaltownie said:

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BearGoggles said:

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socaltownie said:

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Anyone that knows this page knows my opinion of him but at least he seems like he finally got it - that the Russians never always going practice diplomacy the way that Russia has for centuries - mollify and delay and let conditions on the ground actually determine outcomes. My senior thesis in undergrad looked at Soviet negotiating tactics in arms control - the actions over the past 12 months with Trump are straight from that playbook.

What I am hoping is that with new found commitment that it lasts more thana nanosecond and turns into real action on the battlefield.

---

Sincere question - is there any scenario (short of Putin's removal/death), where Ukraine wins the war on the battlefield? What is the end game here?

Or are you simply suggesting that Putin won't negotiate unless he thinks the US/Europe will support Ukraine fighting a longer term (indefinite) war and Trump is signaling that?

I ask these questions as someone who 100% wishes that Ukraine could/would win this war and/or negotiate the best possible outcome. Unfortunately, I think Putin will not concede in part because he will never be convinced that the US/Nato will outlast him and/or impose real consequences.

---

Trying to unpack Russian domestic politics and how it impacts foreign policy is challenging at best. So we are into the deepest of deep ends of crystal ball gazing. Russian opaqueness (true in the cold war, still true today) of actual macro economic and political conditions make this even more challenging. Anyone who says they know is an idiot. And that would be true even if wide open - it is a continent spanning country with several hundreds of millions of people. It is trying to say something about America in a paragraph ;-)

But with that caveat....

1) At some point the war because exhausting. Russian demographics suck and there seems to be some publicly available intel suggesting Russia is having manpower challenges. It is hard to fully assess that from the public sphere because Ukraine has every incentive of the world to highlight this data. But from what I followed it does seem clear to be a problem.

2) Russia has given up on a war on its border where the costs of fighting an attrition war is too steep - Afghanistan. At some point the Kremlin decided that the cost to the USSR for fighting that war was too high. And they didn't have public opinion to worry about. So it isn't like they are completely immune and arguably Putin wields significant less internal power than the Soviets did (as he has to placate oligarchs and others in the petro-crimnal state he has constructed).

3) But a full restoration of Ukraine's borders feels unlikely. I am not even sure it is in the west best interests (see below).

4) So I think with continued Ukrainian willingness to fight and western support we will see, at some point, a negotiated cease fire that provides a land bridge (Think roughly the M14 highway and then some sort of buffer zone North from that). Putin could claim that the Russian lives lost have secured the historic connection to the Crimea. Kiev gets to claim credit for throwing back and liming losses to essentially what they had defacto lost before 2022. We settle into a Korean like standoff likely and including a DMV buffer.

5) I think that deals with a source of tension in the geopolitical situation - that Russia believes it MUST have a land bridge to Crimea which has huge symbolic significance for the Russians. I am not sure there is an American parallel. Absent that concession Russia is liklely to feel continually threatened in its ability to defend Crimea that will continue to remain a source of tension and a possible spark for a resumption of hostilities.

What I don't have a good view on is the conditions in occupied Kherson. If Russification is proceeding in this pretty rural area then I think Russia is unlikely to give up much of the Eastern Bank of the Dneiper. If it isn't going well than I could see that being a "big concession" that Putin gives up for recognition of the territorial gains made before 2022.

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At this point, I think Putin's pride and prestige are so at risk, he might never backdown or compromise. He'd probably still be in Afghanistan if it was up to him but, in any event, USSR left Afghanistan as much because the Soviet Union was crumbling as any other reason.

I don't think Putin cares about the battlefield costs. It seems to me the only potential way to influence him would be if the US and EU could impose economic costs that were exceedingly severe. Is that possible with China and India (among other countries) supporting Russia? It seems not. Are the US/EU willing to escalate with China and India and should they? Hard questions.

BearGoggles said:

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socaltownie said:

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BearGoggles said:

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socaltownie said:

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Anyone that knows this page knows my opinion of him but at least he seems like he finally got it - that the Russians never always going practice diplomacy the way that Russia has for centuries - mollify and delay and let conditions on the ground actually determine outcomes. My senior thesis in undergrad looked at Soviet negotiating tactics in arms control - the actions over the past 12 months with Trump are straight from that playbook.

What I am hoping is that with new found commitment that it lasts more thana nanosecond and turns into real action on the battlefield.

---

Sincere question - is there any scenario (short of Putin's removal/death), where Ukraine wins the war on the battlefield? What is the end game here?

Or are you simply suggesting that Putin won't negotiate unless he thinks the US/Europe will support Ukraine fighting a longer term (indefinite) war and Trump is signaling that?

I ask these questions as someone who 100% wishes that Ukraine could/would win this war and/or negotiate the best possible outcome. Unfortunately, I think Putin will not concede in part because he will never be convinced that the US/Nato will outlast him and/or impose real consequences.

---

Trying to unpack Russian domestic politics and how it impacts foreign policy is challenging at best. So we are into the deepest of deep ends of crystal ball gazing. Russian opaqueness (true in the cold war, still true today) of actual macro economic and political conditions make this even more challenging. Anyone who says they know is an idiot. And that would be true even if wide open - it is a continent spanning country with several hundreds of millions of people. It is trying to say something about America in a paragraph ;-)

But with that caveat....

1) At some point the war because exhausting. Russian demographics suck and there seems to be some publicly available intel suggesting Russia is having manpower challenges. It is hard to fully assess that from the public sphere because Ukraine has every incentive of the world to highlight this data. But from what I followed it does seem clear to be a problem.

2) Russia has given up on a war on its border where the costs of fighting an attrition war is too steep - Afghanistan. At some point the Kremlin decided that the cost to the USSR for fighting that war was too high. And they didn't have public opinion to worry about. So it isn't like they are completely immune and arguably Putin wields significant less internal power than the Soviets did (as he has to placate oligarchs and others in the petro-crimnal state he has constructed).

3) But a full restoration of Ukraine's borders feels unlikely. I am not even sure it is in the west best interests (see below).

4) So I think with continued Ukrainian willingness to fight and western support we will see, at some point, a negotiated cease fire that provides a land bridge (Think roughly the M14 highway and then some sort of buffer zone North from that). Putin could claim that the Russian lives lost have secured the historic connection to the Crimea. Kiev gets to claim credit for throwing back and liming losses to essentially what they had defacto lost before 2022. We settle into a Korean like standoff likely and including a DMV buffer.

5) I think that deals with a source of tension in the geopolitical situation - that Russia believes it MUST have a land bridge to Crimea which has huge symbolic significance for the Russians. I am not sure there is an American parallel. Absent that concession Russia is liklely to feel continually threatened in its ability to defend Crimea that will continue to remain a source of tension and a possible spark for a resumption of hostilities.

What I don't have a good view on is the conditions in occupied Kherson. If Russification is proceeding in this pretty rural area then I think Russia is unlikely to give up much of the Eastern Bank of the Dneiper. If it isn't going well than I could see that being a "big concession" that Putin gives up for recognition of the territorial gains made before 2022.

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At this point, I think Putin's pride and prestige are so at risk, he might never backdown or compromise. He'd probably still be in Afghanistan if it was up to him but, in any event, USSR left Afghanistan as much because the Soviet Union was crumbling as any other reason.

I don't think Putin cares about the battlefield costs. It seems to me the only potential way to influence him would be if the US and EU could impose economic costs that were exceedingly severe. Is that possible with China and India (among other countries) supporting Russia? It seems not. Are the US/EU willing to escalate with China and India and should they? Hard questions.

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Putin has already compromised, twice, first by offering the Istanbul Agreement in April 2024, where he proposed to withdraw to pre-2022 borders in exchange for Ukrainian neutrality and equal rights for the Russian and other minorities. Second, just recently, where he proposed to roughly freeze the current borders in exchange for Ukrainian neutrality.

As to Afghanistan, Putin was in law school when the USSR invaded. I think the Soviets left Afghanistan because it became too difficult to hold with the US having taken out their helicopter and ground attack fleet via Stingers to the Mujahidin.

Putin definitely cares about battlefield losses, if he didn't, he would have just invaded all of Ukraine launching big arrow offensives and broken through the frontlines. Russian strategy is completely built on minimizing their own losses while attriting the Ukrainian army.

The US and EU do not have the means or levers to hurt the Russian economy. That much has been pretty clear by now. If anything, the sanctions helped reinforce Russian domestic industry, in particular the agro-industrial, transport, civil aviation, consumer and of course the military sector. Russia is not just self-sufficient in most commodities, but also is a market driver in many.

This is why we think your are an agitprop. The best estimates flip that l.....1 million russians vs 200k ukrainian. Which makes sense. Offensive operations cost more lives

socaltownie said:

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This is why we think your are an agitprop. The best estimates flip that l.....1 million russians vs 200k ukrainian. Which makes sense. Offensive operations cost more lives

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The link I have provided for the estimate of Russian KIAs is a BBC-affiliated nonprofit that goes through a lot of work to estimate that number.

The Ukrainian estimate has been corroborated by a recent leak of a database of Ukrainian losses that includes the names and addresses of every dead or missing soldier.

Quote:

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Offensive operations cost more lives

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That is precisely why the Russians have been moving pretty slowly, relying on their massive advantage in artillery volume, air superiority (FAB glide bombs) and stand-off weapons (missiles and drones).

socaltownie said:

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This is why we think your [Cal88] are an agitprop. The best estimates flip that l.....1 million russians vs 200k ukrainian. Which makes sense. Offensive operations cost more lives

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This is silly propoganda. If this were the case, why is Ukraine fighting with teenagers and grandpa's?

Cal88 makes sense. Russia pounds UKR w artillery (5x what UKR sends), sends in drones for recon, more bombs if anything moves, and now sends out 3 men lead crew to limit losses.

Trump's post is bizarre, I think he's beyond frustrated. We're really tempting nuclear war. Putin doesn't need to use those as he has other weapons, including the new Hazel unblockable hypersonic missile. Some hypothesize EU leaders push war as a means to deflect from their internal disasters.